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Abstract:
A whole branch of the economic literature suggests that institutional differences between and
inside educational systems may have a larger influence on students performance than the amount of
resources devoted to schooling. In this paper, we use the PISA 2000 international OECD data to
evaluate the impacts of organizational and institutional factors on students performance. We estimate
an education production function with country fixed-effect  and  school  random-effect.We  find  that,
alongside individual characteristics, school autonomy in decisions regarding the recruitment of new
personnel  as  well  as  pedagogical  training strongly  affect  students  performance.  On  the  contrary,
measures of school resources and standardised evaluation of students have no consistent effect.
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Over the  last decades, multiple attempts have  been  made to estimate an education
production  function,  linking  various  socio-economic  factors  to  an  indicator  of  students'
performance. This empirical literature, however, has led to ambiguous results. In particular,
no mechanical relationship between the amount of resources fed into the educational system
and  pupils’  performances  has  been  identified  (e.g.  Coleman,  1966;  Hanushek,  2002;
Woessmann,  2003).  In this  context,  some  authors  suggested to  pay  more  attention  to the
organizational  aspects of the schooling process, and  in particular to the  specific  incentive
structures which prevail within schools (Hanushek 1997, Bishop et al. 2000).
The aim of the present paper is to provide an accurate evaluation of the impact of
school organizational characteristics on pupils’ results. Using recent international OECD data
(which provides detailed information on both pupils and schools), we estimate an education
production  function,  controlling  for  the  differences  in  institutional  and  organizational
arrangements that exist between countries and between schools. In a first section, we briefly
summarize the literature on the education production function. In a second section, we present
our data and explain our choice of explanatory variables. Section 3 is devoted to econometric
modelling, with an emphasis put on the estimation strategy. Our main results are presented in
Section 4. Our conclusions are given in a final section.
1. School characteristics as inputs in the education production function.
After Becker (1962) introduced the concept of human capital, economists began to
regard education as a production process. In particular, schooling (initial training) came to be
seen as the process by which individuals acquire their initial amount of human capital, prior to
their entry on the labour market. Theory predicts that individuals with a higher human capital
will obtain higher wages (or, loosely speaking, “better jobs”). At the macroeconomic level,3
the stock (and quality) of human capital in a country may influence its long-term economic
growth (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Becker et al., 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992).
In that perspective, understanding the reasons why some pupils perform better than
others (and are thus able to undergo longer schooling) has become of critical importance to
economists over the last decades. Drawing a parallel between the process of human capital
acquisition and a firm’s production process, the concept of an education production function
has become the primary tool to investigate this topic. A whole branch of the literature has
been dedicated to the estimation of the education production function, defined as an efficient
technology (Cooper & Cohn, 1997) turning a vector of inputs X into a vector of outputs Y:
(1) Y = f(X)
In Equation (1) above, X may include such inputs as a child’s abilities, his/her family
background, and/or educational resources, and where Y may be a set of test scores or exam
results. In the literature, pupils’ outcomes are generally  function of two different types of
inputs: variables describing the socio-economic profile of the pupils on the one hand, and
variables describing the “quality” of schools on the other (Vignoles et al., 2000).
In empirical analyses, the education production function thus generally takes the form:
(2) yis = f(Sis, Pis)
where,  for  an  individual  i   trained  in  school  s,  y  is  the  outcome,  S  the  vector  of  school
characteristics, and P the vector of variables describing the pupil’s socio-economic profile.
Proxies for “school quality” are very often based on expenditures (such as school budget, or
expenditures per pupil). Most analyses relying on such proxies, however, have failed to prove
the existence of a systematic relationship between schools resources and pupils performance
(Hanushek, 1986, 1989, 1996, 1997; Gundlach et al., 1999; Vignoles et al., 2000).
For this reason, it has been suggested to concentrate the analysis on the organizational
characteristics of schools (e.g. Chubb & Moe, 1990; Woessmann, 2000; Hanushek 2003). In4
the present research, we attempt to do so, by estimating an education production  function
where  institutional  and  organizational  settings  are  taken  into  account,  alongside  more
“traditional”  inputs.  The  details  of  our  choice  of  variables  and  the  practical  constraints
imposed by the data are developed extensively in the following sections.
2. Data and choice of variables.
2.1. THE PISA 2000 DATABASE
This paper uses cross-section data from the OECD survey conducted in 2000 as part of
the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). The PISA 2000 database contains
math, science and reading test scores of a sample of 15  years-old pupils coming  from 28
OECD  and  non-OECD  countries
1  (cf.  Table 1).  These  pupils  are  nested  within  schools,
potentially attending different grades in countries where grade repetition is common practice.
The sampling process was rather specific (c.f. OECD, 2002, for technical details): all
the students in the sample (i.e., approximately 175000) took a standard reading test, which
provided the reading test score. Part of them also took a math test and/or a sciences test,
which yielded two other smaller samples of approximately 97000 pupils each. The sampling
procedure ensured that the three samples had the same by-country composition, and that each
variable had the same mean and standard deviation in each sample (as can be seen in Tables 1
and 2 respectively). In our study, the same econometric models will be applied to each of
these three samples separately.
For each pupil i trained in school j, the PISA data provides us with a large number of
variables characterizing the student and/or the school, from which we selected the variables
relevant to our analysis. Following a common practice in the literature (Jencks and Brown,
                                               
1 Canada, Japan, Germany and Korea have been excluded due to missing variables (some variables used in the
estimations are not available for these countries).5
1999; Vignoles et al., 2000), we use the test scores (normalized
 to mean 500 and variance 100
during the construction of the PISA 2000 database) as a measure of education output.
–  TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE –
2.2. CHOICE OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES.
Table  2  gives  summary  statistics  for  our  selection  of  explanatory  variables,  by
discipline. They were chosen in order to avoid correlations, while staying as close as possible
to  the  conceptual  framework  sketched  in  the  theoretical  literature
2  (e.g.,  Creemer,  1994;
Scheerens, 1997; Creemers et al., 2000). A small number of factors are herein put forward to
explain pupils’ success: (1) their initial aptitudes, (2) their ability to understand instructions,
(3) their perseverance or effort, (4) the opportunities offered to them, and (5) the quality of
instruction.
First of all, relying on an extensive literature (e.g. Brown, 1991; Ehrenberg, Goldhaber
et al 1995; McNabb, Sarmistha et al, 2002), we control for gender and age. Indeed, although
all pupils in PISA 2000 are aged 15 at the time of the survey, not all pupils are born the same
month which allows for some variation.
– TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE –
We then chose relevant measures and/or proxies for the five groupes of factors listed
above, starting with the opportunities offered to pupils.These are represented by the country
of origin of the pupils, and a set of variables describing their  family  background: type of
family (nuclear or not), OECD index of the father’s education level (FISCED), and highest
OECD  socio-economic  index  in  the  household  (HISEI).  We  also  included  the  number  of
books  in  the  house,  several  studies  (e.g.  Murnane  et  al,  1981;  Todd  and  Wolpin,  2003)6
suggesting that it is a fairly reliable proxy to describe a family’s inclination towards learning.
Finally, we added a measure of the educational support the child receives from his/her parents
(FAMEDSUP); this variable is a quantitative indicator specifically developed by the PISA
team (cf. OECD, 2002 for details).
The quality of instruction was captured by several school proxies. We first introduced
the students/teacher ratio, the condition of the buildings, the availability of teaching material,
and the proportion of qualified teachers
3 in the school. The students/teacher ratio can be seen
as an indicator of class size (Chubb and Moe, 1990;  Card and Krueger, 1992). Whether or not
class size has an effect on students’ achievement is a hotly debated topic in the economic
literature: some studies (e.g.  Angrist  and  Lavy,  1999;  Boozer  and  Rouse,  2001;  Krueger,
1999, 2003) identify an inverse relationship (larger classes yielding a lower achievement).
Other studies, however, (Hanushek, 1986, 1996, 2003; Hoxby, 1996, 2000) underline
that this is far from systematic, and suggest that institutional factors and incentives structures
may have a stronger effect. Woessmann (2000), using data from a previous PISA survey,
found that students’ performance could stem  primarily  from  centralized  examinations  and
school organizational characteristics, such as autonomy in personnel decisions. To explore
this possibility, we added three institutionnal indicators that complete our description of the
quality of instruction: the degree of centralization in the hiring of teachers, the type of pupils’
assessment (the use of standardised tests), and the percentage of public funding.
To some extent, the ability to understand instruction, as well as perseverance or effort,
can be captured by the grade which the pupils are attending at the time of the survey. Since
they are all aged 15 (with minor monthly variations as explained above), one can reasonably
expect that lower grades correspond to less able and/or less perseverant pupils. In order to try
                                                                                                                                                  
2 In empirical applications, however, it is often difficult to find precise measures of, or even relevant proxies for,
these five factors. Todd & Wolpin (2003) thus underline how data limitation may lead to various biases,
especially in cases where the econometric analysis is only loosely related to a theoretical framework.
3 So-called "qualified" teachers obtained an ISCED5 qualification in pedagogy.7
and isolate more precisely effort per se, we added a synthetic index of the time each pupil
spends doing homework each week (HMWKTIME). Again, more details on the construction
of this index will be found in OECD (2000).
Finally, the initial aptitudes of the pupils were the most difficult factor to control for
with the PISA2000 data. We used the daily time dedicated to “reading for enjoyment”, hoping
this measure can somehow be correlated to the pupils’ taste for learning. This indicator may
be far from perfect, however, as children’s tastes can be strongly influenced by their parents
(although none of the “family background” variables was correlated to the time spent reading
for leisure). Further differences in initial aptitudes can only be captured by the residual term
(random error). This naturally depends on the specification of our econometric model, which
we will now examine in detail.
3. Econometric modelling and estimation strategy.
In theoretical works, the education production function f may appear as a “black box”,
with its the functional form left unspecified. Applied analyses, however, generally rely on a
classical regression approach, which assumes a linear (or log-linear) shape for f. In this study,
we expend the linear regression method by adding fixed and random effects. This allows us to
take into account the hierarchical (or clustered) nature of the PISA 2000 data. Indeed students
are grouped in schools that function in a particular country. The position in this hierarchy
affects results and should be taken into account when estimating. The inclusion of both fixed
and clustered random effects also gives more flexibility to the econometric model.
Our estimation strategy consist in three steps. We first estimate, as a “benchmark”, a
conventional linear regression model by the OLS technique:
(3) i i i X Y e b + = .8
where Yi is the test score of pupil i in a given discipline, Xi the vector of explanatory variables
with b its associated vector of parameters (to be estimated), and ei a random error term. One
can reasonably expect this model to be biased, since country-specific characteristics (which
may be partially unobserved) are not controlled for. Thus, we may find a strong effect of, say,
school characteristics, which is in fact an effect of specific national institutional arrangements
or of other social and historical factors.
In order to control for such effects, we introduce a country fixed effect (i.e. a series of
dummy indicators) in our linear model of the education production function, which leads to
the following fixed-effect model:
(4) Yik = bk + b.Xik + eik
where, for student i in country k, Yik is the test score in a given discipline, Xi the vector of
explanatory  variables,  b  its  associated  vector of  parameters,  bk  the  country-specific  fixed
effect, and eik a random error term.
Although this model is more sophisticated than the basic linear regression model, it
may still be biased if pupils’ performance is affected by unobserved school characteristics
such as quality of management, security or teacher motivation. We thus need to control for
unobserved school heterogeneity; Murnane et al (1981) achieved this by introducing a school
fixed-effects in their regression model of the education production function. In our model, we
want to take into account the stratified nature of the data, and thus introduce a nested
4 school
random  effect  in  our  regression  model.  This  modelling  allows  to  control  for  sources  of
unobserved heterogeneity supposedly uncorrelated to the explanatory variables. The random
effect is also nested in countries, since the distribution of the unknown school characteristics
may be proper to the national environment.
                                               
4  “Nested” means here that the distribution of the school random effect may vary across countries.9
The resulting mixed model is written:
(5) Yijk = bk + Xijk.b + gjk + eiik
where, for student i in school j in country k, Yijk is the test score in a given discipline, Xijk is
the vector of explanatory variables, b its associated vector of parameters, bk is the country
fixed effect,  gjk is the school random effect (nested within country j) and eiik the residual term.
Similar models, also known as multilevel models (Yang, Goldstein et al, 2002), have been
used to analyze examination results in a single country (the United Kingdom) and a single
discipline (Mathematics). The model we  applied  here  is  both  simple  and  convenient,  and
fitted to the analysis of several countries and disciplines.
Both  the  fixed  effect  and  the  mixed  models  are  estimated  using  the  Maximum
Likelihood technique. The results of the estimations for the three models (linear, fixed effect
and mixed) and the three disciplines (maths, reading and science) are given and commented in
the next section.
4. Empirical results
Tables 3, 4 and 5 give the parameter and standard deviation estimates of the three
models (OLS regression, simple fixed-effect and mixed) for mathematics, reading and science
test scores respectively. Table 6 presents the details of the country fixed-effect, by discipline,
for the last two models (simple fixed-effect and mixed). Recall from Section 2 that test scores
are standardised at mean 500 and standard deviation 100 for all countries. This means we can
interpret the coefficients as percentages of standard deviation. Goodness-of-fit statistics are
featured  at  the  bottom  of  each  table.  The  results  of  the  estimations  appear  to  be  quite
consistent across disciplines (which, given the sampling scheme, does make sense).10
In  particular,  individual  characteristics  (gender  excepted),  ability/effort,  and  family
background  variables  have  a  similar  impact  on  each  test  score.  The  case  of  gender  is
interesting, since it shows that female students can expect lower scores in mathematics and
science, but higher scores in reading. This result is similar to what is generally observed in the
literature (e.g., Ehrenberg, Goldhaber et al., 1995); a (partial) explanation frequently proposed
for this outcome is the absence of female role models in science and mathematics.
The inclusion of fixed- and random- effects in the model slightly affects the size of the
impact of individual characteristics, effort, and family background, but not its significance
(the exception being the country of origin, which doesn’t affect the math test score in the OLS
specification, although it has a significant effect in the two other specifications). For instance,
an increment in the number of books at home explains 12 to 13% of the test score standard
deviation in the OLS specification, 10 to 11% in the fixed-effect specification, and 8.2% in
the mixed specification, no matter which discipline one considers. Similarly, each additional
hour spent doing homework each week explains 9 to 10%  of a standard deviation in the OLS
model, 10 to 12% in the fixed-effect model, and 7% in the mixed model.
A  surprising  result,  regarding  family  background,  is  the  negative  effect  (across
specifications and disciplines) of the “family educational support” (FAMEDSUP) variable on
the test score. It may be that too much support from his/her family (parents, but also brothers
and sisters) reduces the pupil’s autonomy and ability to face a test on his/her own. This result
could also mean that family support lacks (or even conflicts with) the pedagogy a professional
teacher develops in the classroom, and has a counterproductive effect on pupils’ performance.
Our measure of initial aptitudes clearly shows its limitations: although it has a positive
influence on all test scores, its effect on maths is very small (it explains approximately 2% of
the standard deviation in the fixed-effect and mixed models, and is not significant in the OLS
specification). The effects on the science test score are somewhat larger (3% in the OLS, 5%11
in the fixed-effect model, and 7% in the mixed model). Quite naturally, we observe the largest
effects on the reading test score (6% in the OLS, 7% in the fixed-effect model, and 8% in the
mixed  model).These  results  simply  suggest  that  the  taste  for  learning  (and  the  cognitive
aptitudes) cannot be captured by the taste for reading only.
Let us now focus on the school characteristics,  in order to examine  the  respective
effects of institutional / organizational arrangements and monetary resources. The latter do
not seem to have any consistent effect on test scores: the (commonly used) students/teacher
ratio has a slightly negative impact (between -0.1% and -1.2%) on all test scores in the OLS
and fixed-effect specifications. In the mixed model (our most reliable specification), the ratio
has no significant effect on the math and reading test scores, and a very weak effect (at the
10% level of significance) on the science test score.
Similarly,  the  condition  of  the  school  buildings  has  no  significant  impact  on  the
science test score (no matter what specification is used); if we rely on the mixed model, it has
no effect on the other test scores either. Finally, the lack of teaching material has a significant
negative impact on the math and reading test scores (the estimates given by the mixed model
are  10%  and  -14%  respectively).  According  to  the  mixed  specification,  it  has  no  effect,
however, on the science test score.
A more significant resource-related variable is the attainment of a degree in pedagogy
by teachers. It is resource-related because of the cost related to hiring teachers with higher
degrees. The proportion of teachers that have a minimum level of qualification
5 in pedagogy
has a positive influence on students’ test scores in all disciplines. When fixed and/or random
effects are added in the regression, the size of the effect is halved; the  most conservative
estimates, given by the mixed model, are 12% of a standard deviation for the math test score,
10% for the reading test score, and 15% for the science test score. This result is in line with
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findings  from the  litterature. Many authors find that teacher  qualification  as  measured  by
years of experience or the attainment of a university diploma is not a significant factor of
student success at tests. It seems that specific pedagogical training is the more determinant
teacher skill (Monk (1994), Angrist and Lavy (2001)).
Institutional and organizational variables also have a consistent effect. More precisely,
school autonomy in the recruitment of teachers has a strong positive influence on students
performance. This result is remarkably consistent over disciplines and specification: the most
trustable estimates, given by the mixed model, suggest that a decentralized hiring process can
increase students test scores by 12% in mathematics, 11% in reading, and 7% in science.
The results regarding the modes of assessment are less clear-cut, however: while the
OLS and fixed-effect models indicate a small positive impact of school-designed (rather than
standardised) tests on pupils’ performance in all three disciplines, the mixed model suggests
that this impact is not significant. A possible explanation for this outcome is that the type of
examination procedure is often (although not systematically) adopted on a national basis; as
such, its effect may be (partially) captured by the country fixed-effect. If that is effectively the
case, our results would echo Woessmann (2000)’s findings (using the previous PISA survey
data): assessment procedures matter. The main divergence between our findings and those of
Woessmann  (2000)  is  that  the  effect  of  standardized  assesment  procedures  on  students'
performance is questionable when the PISA 2000 data is used.
Finally, if the amount of monetary resources spent at the school level does not seem to
be  the  primary  determinant  of  students’  performance,  the  origin  of  these  resources  may
nevertheless matter. Indeed, according to the mixed model estimates, more than 50 percent of
public funding may lower the test scores by 11% in the case of mathematics, 14% in the case
of reading, and 15% in science. Since a larger share public funding is often associated with
more constraint (submission to standard rules regarding pedagogy and internal organization,13
for  instance),  this  result  again  points  out  towards  school  autonomy  as  a  determinant  of
students’ performance.
                                      –    TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE –
–  TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE –
–  TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE –
–  TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE –
5. Conclusions and policy implications.
In this paper, we used the PISA 2000 cross section data to estimate the impacts of
organizational  and  institutional  factors on students performance (controlling  for  individual
characteristics). In order to take into account the hierarchical nature of the data, we introduced
a country fixed-effect and a school random-effect in our regression model of the “education
production function”. Our results echoe the findings of Hanushek (1986, 1996, 1997, 2003),
Hoxby (1996, 2000) and Woessmann (2000), in the sense that organizational and institutional
factors may matter more than the amount of school resources.
More  precisely,  we  found  that  school  autonomy  in  the  decision  of  hiring  teachers
significantly increases students performance, while a proportion of public funding higher than
50% tends to decrease performance. These results, however, should not be misinterpreted:
they do not imply that public expenditures on education should be cut, but rather that more
autonomy should be given to schools (including state-funded schools), especially in local and
internal matters. Our results suggest that the mode of assessment also matters, but it is not
clear whether standardized or school-designed tests are more helpful to students.
However, caution is needed, since the PISA 2000 data present a number of limitations
that may condition our results. The main limitation comes from the cross-section nature of the14
data,  which  implies  to  relate  test  scores  to  contemporaneous  measures  of  inputs  in  the
education production function. Such a model rely on the implicit assumption that inputs are
unchanging over time – which is obviously not true for all of them. Moreover, the PISA 2000
survey does not provide complementarity measures of students achievement, which could be
related to the tests score in a “value added” model (Ehrenberg, Goldhaber, et al., 1995; Todd
and Wolpin, 2003). In the absence of longitudinal data, such a measure would be helpful in
order to control more adequately for the pupils’ initial aptitudes.
In spite of these shortcomings, the PISA 2000 data has several advantages: it is readily
available, provides very detailed information, allows for comparisons across countries, and
provides  new  directions  for  research.  However,  in  order  to  implement  relevant  education
policies, data allowing for longitudinal analysis is needed, in order to assess more firmly the
type of results that have been highlighted in this paper.
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Table 1: composition of the sample by country and discipline
Country Math Reading Sciences
Number % of sample Number % of sample Number % of sample
Australia 2859 2.9 5176 3.0 2860 2.9
Austria 2640 2.7 4745 2.7 2669 2.7
Belgium 3784 3.9 6670 3.8 3722 3.8
Brazil 2717 2.8 4893 2.8 2710 2.8
Czech Republic 3066 3.1 5365 3.1 3062 3.1
Denmark 2382 2.4 4235 2.4 2346 2.4
Finland 2703 2.8 4864 2.8 2710 2.8
France 2597 2.7 4673 2.7 2592 2.7
Greece 2605 2.7 4672 2.7 2593 2.7
Hungary 2799 2.9 4887 2.8 2800 2.9
Iceland 1882 1.9 3372 1.9 1859 1.9
Ireland 2128 2.2 3854 2.2 2134 2.2
Italy 2765 2.8 4984 2.8 2766 2.8
Latvia 2149 2.2 3893 2.2 2157 2.2
Liechtenstein 175 0.2 314 0.2 176 0.2
Luxemburg 1959 2.0 3528 2.0 1950 2.0
Mexico 2567 2.6 4600 2.6 2548 2.6
Netherlands 1382 1.4 2503 1.4 1396 1.4
New Zealand 2048 2.1 3667 2.1 2029 2.1
Norway 2307 2.4 4147 2.4 2308 2.4
Poland 1976 2.0 3654 2.1 2043 2.1
Portugal 2545 2.6 4585 2.6 2552 2.6
Russian Federation 3719 3.8 6701 3.8 3719 3.8
Spain 3428 3.5 6214 3.6 3457 3.6
Sweden 2464 2.5 4416 2.5 2444 2.5
Switzerland 3396 3.5 6100 3.5 3397 3.5
UK 5195 5.3 9340 5.3 5179 5.3
USA 2135 2.2 3846 2.2 2129 2.2
Total 97384 100.0 174896 100.0 97321 100.020
Table 2: summary statistics by discipline (sub-sample)
Variable Definition Math Reading Science
Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev)
Age Age in months at time of survey 188.62 (3.44) 188.63 (3.44) 188.62 (3.44)
Gender 1 if female, 0 if male 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
Origin 1 if country of test, 0 if other 0.93 (0.25) 0.93 (0.25) 0.93 (0.25)
Family 1 if non-nuclear
6, 0 if nuclear 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
FISCED OECD index of father’s education 4.45 (1.43) 4.45 (1.43) 4.45 (1.43)
# of books Number of books at home 4.47 (1.54) 4.47 (1.54) 4.47 (1.54)
HISEI Highest ISEI in the family 49.01 (16.44) 49.00 (16.43) 48.93 (16.45)
FAMEDSUP FAMily EDucational SUPport 0.00 (1.00) -0.01 (1.00) -0.01 (1.00)
S/T ratio Student/teacher ratio 13.95 (6.61) 13.96 (6.60) 13.94 (6.61)
Buildings condition 2: good, 1: poor, 0: unknown 1.89 (0.41) 1.89 (0.42) 1.89 (0.42)
Teaching material 2: available, 1: lacking, 0: no information 1.88 (0.43) 1.88 (0.43) 1.88 (0.43)
% qualified % of qualified professors in school 0.61 (0.40) 0.61 (0.40) 0.61 (0.40)
Hiring teachers 2: central, 1: decentralized, 0 : no info 1.23 (0.58) 1.23 (0.58) 1.22 (0.58)
Assessment 2: students assessed by std test at least
once a year, 1: students assessed by
school-designed (non-std) test, 0: no info
1.38 (0.69) 1.38 (0.69) 1.38 (0.69)
Funding 1 if more than 50% of school resources
come from public authorities, 0 otherwise 0.91 (0.29) 0.91 (0.29) 0.91 (0.29)
Grade Grade attented at time of survey 9.62 (0.75) 9.62 (0.75) 9.62 (0.75)
HMWKTIME Index of weekly homework time 0.02 (1.01) 0.02 (1.01) 0.02 (1.01)
Reading as leisure Number of hours dedicated daily to
reading as leisure
2.27 (1.15) 2.27 (1.15) 2.28 (1.15)
Observations 97384 174896 97321
                                               
6 E.g. single parent, recomposed family, etc.21
Table 3: estimates for the math test score
Variables OLS Fixed-Effect Model Mixed Model
Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E.
Intercept 270.12 (21.01)*** 316.43 (20.60)*** 302.71 (20.31)***
Age -1.18 (0.11)*** -1.25 (0.11)*** -1.10 (0.11)***
Gender Female
Male
-19.20 (0.78)*** -20.03 (0.75)*** -19.55 (0.72)***
Origin Country of test
Other country
2.85 (2.04) 7.30 (1.99)*** 4.44 (1.90)**
Family Non-Nuclear
Nuclear
-14.68 (0.88)*** -13.75 (0.86)*** -9.51 (0.81)***
FISCED 5.38 (0.33)*** 5.01 (0.32)*** 3.13 (0.31)***
# of books 13.01 (0.28)*** 10.84 (0.28)*** 8.24 (0.27)***
HISEI 0.68 (0.03)*** 0.73 (0.03)*** 0.49 (0.03)***
FAMEDSUP -11.87 (0.36)*** -11.60 (0.36)*** -9.77 (0.34)***
S/T ratio -1.17 (0.04)*** -0.14 (0.05)*** -0.06 (0.13)
Poor -5.11 (1.84)*** -3.98 (1.80)** -3.07 (3.59) Buildings condition
Missing info 0.24 (4.62) 0.85 (4.48) -5.16 (9.29)
Good
Lacking -17.23 (1.52)*** -8.37 (1.51)*** -9.77 (3.26)*** Teaching material
Missing info -23.71 (3.98)*** -14.27 (3.88)*** -6.44 (8.90)
Available
%qualified 40.20 (1.15)*** 16.66 (1.79)*** 11.80 (3.40)***
Hiring Decentralized 9.21 (0.99)*** 11.06 (1.18)*** 11.96 (2.45)***
Missing info 6.75 (1.83)*** -8.25 (4.31)* -7.42 (7.61)
Centralized
Pupils assessment Non-std  test 4.69 (0.98)*** 4.17 (1.01)*** 0.13 (2.01)
Missing info -21.96 (1.07)*** -6.36 (2.26)*** -1.87 (4.30)
Std test
Funding ³ 50% public
< 50% public
-1.91 (1.21) -8.38 (1.26)*** -10.70 (2.88)***
Grade 34.19 (0.54)*** 31.42 (0.65)*** 32.70 (0.74)***
HMWKTIME 9.49 (0.40)*** 10.98 (0.39)*** 7.84 (0.38)***
Reading as leisure -0.06 (0.33) 2.20 (0.33)*** 2.57 (0.31)***
Significance level: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
Goodness-of-fit
OLS: a Fisher test led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “b=0” at the 1% level of significance
(R² = 0.40, adjusted R² = 0.40)
Fixed-effect and mixed models: a LR test led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “b=0” at the 1% level of
significance. A Fisher test shown the country fixed effect to be overall significant at the 1% level (c.f. Table 6
for details).22
Table 4: estimates for the reading test score
Variables OLS Fixed-Effect Model Mixed Model
Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E.
Intercept 209.36 (14.37)*** 253.59 (14.29)*** 267.33 (14.49)***
Age -0.91 (0.08)*** -1.23 (0.08)*** -1.08 (0.07)***
Gender Female
Male
14.66 (0.53)*** 13.28 (0.52)*** 11.44 (0.50)***
Origin Country of test
Other country
9.35 (1.39)*** 10.02 (1.37)*** 7.83 (1.30)***
Family Non-Nuclear
Nuclear
-12.72 (0.60)*** -13.17 (0.60)*** -9.95 (0.56)***
FISCED 4.43 (0.22)*** 4.06 (0.22)*** 1.36 (0.22)***
# of books 12.11 (0.19)*** 11.37 (0.20)*** 8.21 (0.19)***
HISEI 0.86 (0.02)*** 0.82 (0.02)*** 0.54 (0.02)***
FAMEDSUP -13.25 (0.25)*** -12.86 (0.24)*** -10.70 (0.23)***
S/T ratio -0.75 (0.03)*** -0.39 (0.04)*** -0.12 (0.12)
Poor -9.11 (1.25)*** -6.16 (1.24)*** -4.97 (3.22) Buildings condition
Missing info -0.05 (3.17) 4.34 (3.12) -4.78 (8.31)
Good
Lacking -22.05 (1.04)*** -12.17 (1.05)*** -13.99 (2.94)*** Teaching material
Missing info -9.33 (2.72)*** -4.40 (2.69) 3.80 (8.14)
Available
%qualified 23.19 (0.79)*** 12.82 (1.24)*** 10.07 (2.95)***
Hiring Decentralized 4.15 (0.68)*** 4.96 (0.82)*** 10.85 (2.18)***
Missing info 2.93 (1.24)** -18.00 (2.97)*** -15.70 (6.79)**
Centralized
Pupils assessment Non-std  test -0.01 (0.67) 2.58 (0.70)*** -1.21 (1.77)
Missing info -45.56 (0.73)*** -5.59 (1.56)*** -3.04 (3.82)
Std test
Funding ³ 50% public
< 50% public
-2.60 (0.83)*** -8.62 (0.88)*** -14.15 (2.61)***
Grade 33.57 (0.37)*** 37.17 (0.45)*** 35.70 (0.52)***
HMWKTIME 10.05 (0.27)*** 11.86 (0.27)*** 7.72 (0.26)***
Reading as leisure 5.67 (0.23)*** 6.94 (0.23)*** 8.19 (0.21)***
Significance level: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
Goodness-of-fit
OLS: a Fisher test led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “b=0” at the 1% level of significance
(R² = 0.40, adjusted R² = 0.40)
Fixed-effect and mixed models: a LR test led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “b=0” at the 1% level of
significance. A Fisher test shown the country fixed effect to be overall significant at the 1% level (c.f. Table 6
for details).23
Table 5: estimates for the science test score
Variables OLS Fixed-Effect Model Mixed Model
Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E.
Intercept 189.97 (21.80)*** 209.40 (21.79)*** 209.42 (21.75)***
Age -0.48 (0.12)*** -0.35 (0.12)*** -0.37 (0.12)***
Gender Female
Male
-6.87 (0.81)*** -7.55 (0.80)*** -8.84 (0.77)***
Origin Country of test
Other country
6.38 (2.08)*** 9.33 (2.07)*** 10.43 (2.01)***
Family Non-Nuclear
Nuclear
-8.61 (0.92)*** -9.25 (0.92)*** -6.31 (0.88)***
FISCED 4.85 (0.33)*** 4.78 (0.34)*** 3.43 (0.33)***
# of books 12.27 (0.30)*** 10.72 (0.30)*** 8.26 (0.30)***
HISEI 0.72 (0.03)*** 0.74 (0.03)*** 0.49 (0.03)***
FAMEDSUP -12.83 (0.37)*** -12.62 (0.37)*** -11.55 (0.35)***
S/T ratio -0.95 (0.04)*** -0.34 (0.05)*** -0.25 (0.13)*
Poor 0.03 (1.90) 0.52 (1.89) -0.67 (3.66) Buildings condition
Missing info 5.20 (4.83) 7.30 (4.78) -3.74 (9.53)
Good
Lacking -13.87 (1.56)*** -6.49 (1.58)*** -4.51 (3.30) Teaching material
Missing info -9.97 (4.13)** -5.72 (4.10) -0.40 (9.09)
Available
%qualified teachers 32.21 (1.19)*** 18.50 (1.88)*** 15.41 (3.50)***
Hiring Decentralized 6.50 (1.03)*** 4.61 (1.25)*** 7.12 (2.50)***
Missing info 7.00 (1.86)*** -8.52 (4.59)* -10.29 (7.78)
Centralized
Pupils assessment Non-std  test 2.22 (1.01)** 3.68 (1.06)*** 0.68 (2.05)
Missing info -42.71 (1.11)*** -10.73 (2.42)*** -5.22 (4.40)
Std test
Funding ³ 50% public
< 50% public
-7.59 (1.26)*** -13.79 (1.33)*** -15.32 (2.92)***
Grade 28.84 (0.56)*** 25.73 (0.69)*** 27.71 (0.79)***
HMWKTIME 8.52 (0.41)*** 9.99 (0.41)*** 6.97 (0.41)***
Reading as leisure 3.44 (0.35)*** 5.17 (0.35)*** 6.58 (0.33)***
Significance level: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
Goodness-of-fit
OLS: a Fisher test led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “b=0” at the 1% level of significance
(R² = 0.33, adjusted R² = 0.33)
Fixed-effect and mixed models: a LR test led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “b=0” at the 1% level of
significance. A Fisher test shown the country fixed effect to be overall significant at the 1% level (c.f. Table 6
for details).23
Table 6: country effects by discipline
MATH READ SCIENCE
Fixed-effect Mixed model Fixed-effect Mixed model Fixed-effect Mixed model
Estimate (Std Err) Estimate (Std Err) Estimate (Std Err) Estimate (Std Err) Estimate (Std Err) Estimate (Std Err)
Australia 13.43 (2.90)*** 23.49 (5.50)*** -8.20 (2.01)*** 5.28 (5.02) -0.18 (3.05) 11.28 (5.57)**
Austria 31.29 (4.91)*** 40.32 (6.78)*** 8.65 (3.44)** 18.37 (5.88)*** 19.23 (5.21)*** 29.78 (7.01)***
Belgium 35.33 (4.01)*** 44.58 (6.21) *** 6.78 (2.78)** 17.50 (5.49)*** 4.15 (4.24) 13.46 (6.36)**
Brazil -51.15 (2.26)*** -51.55 (5.88)*** -22.74 (1.56)*** -30.39 (5.46)*** -41.82 (2.36)*** -40.51 (5.94)***
Czech Rep. 5.14 (3.28) 15.21 (5.24)*** -13.62 (2.28)*** -4.68 (4.72) 6.22 (3.46)* 16.57 (5.34)***
Denmark 40.50 (6.02)*** 51.60 (7.04)*** 12.66 (4.22)*** 22.74 (5.85)*** -5.09 (6.41) 6.84 (7.38)
Finland 66.56 (4.78)*** 76.37 (6.41)*** 60.05 (3.32)*** 70.39 (5.54)*** 47.35 (5.03)*** 58.73 (6.59)***
France 36.40 (2.08)*** 42.14 (5.36)*** 1.84 (1.44) 9.17 (5.07)* -1.25 (2.20) 5.47 (5.40)
Greece -51.29 (3.66)*** -45.13 (6.38)*** -49.27 (2.53)*** -40.02 (5.72)*** -46.24 (3.86)*** -40.34 (6.49)***
Hungary -7.70 (3.61)** 3.13 (5.65) -29.34 (2.50)*** -19.39 (5.05)*** -10.48 (3.79)*** 0.52 (5.76)
Iceland 3.92 (21.59) 13.39 (20.28) -24.84 (15.03)* -13.03 (14.78) -22.40 (22.97) -12.44 (21.79)
Ireland 4.47 (4.74) 14.51 (6.27)** 11.37 (3.28)*** 20.89 (5.41)*** 3.60 (5.01) 13.87 (6.47)**
Italie -26.57 (2.82)*** -21.01 (6.27)*** -25.29 (1.95)*** -15.07 (5.78)*** -21.92 (2.96)*** -15.69 (6.34)**
Latvia -32.87 (8.07)*** -21.29 (8.85)** -54.90 (5.53)*** -42.52 (7.05)*** -47.31 (8.39)*** -34.67 (9.20)***
Liechtenstein 58.24 (67.54) 69.65 (61.97)*** 11.83 (45.47) 24.69 (42.95) -1.11 (68.09) 12.11 (63.35)
Luxembourg -4.64 (21.72) 9.17 (21.57) -24.56 (15.14) -6.50 (16.35) -25.09 (23.16) -9.84 (23.03)
Mexico -45.18 (2.57)*** -48.97 (6.26)*** -41.91 (1.77)*** -48.48 (5.82)*** -34.67 (2.68)*** -35.21 (6.30)***
Netherlands 81.15 (3.94)*** 86.94 (7.11)*** 39.52 (2.73)*** 46.06 (6.45)*** 47.14 (4.19)*** 55.11 (7.24)***
New Zealand -1.39 (5.99) 8.15 (7.16) -29.26 (4.13)*** -16.01 (5.93)*** -12.31 (6.27)* -3.23 (7.40)
Norway 15.14 (7.48)** 20.46 (11.10)* 5.39 (5.21) 19.94 (9.67)** 7.59 (7.98) 17.03 (11.44)
Poland 20.04 (4.79)*** 16.61 (9.26)* 16.06 (3.30)*** 12.77 (8.42) 6.90 (5.07) 10.77 (9.42)
Portugal -2.60 (4.06) 7.02 (6.54) -11.16 (2.82)*** 1.93 (5.82) -14.17 (4.28)*** -3.54 (6.69)
Russia -23.22 (2.60)*** -16.12 (6.16)*** -58.83 (1.80)*** -50.28 (5.71)*** -46.18 (2.77)*** -41.79 (6.23)***
Spain -1.59 (2.84) 5.45 (6.05) -11.58 (1.96)*** -0.90 (5.55) -2.65 (2.97) 3.82 (6.12)
Sweden 32.51 (4.13)*** 43.88 (6.00)*** 26.60 (2.88)*** 36.44 (5.31)*** 16.80 (4.39)*** 29.10 (6.17)***
Switzerland 59.41 (4.78)*** 68.55 (6.37)*** 15.50 (3.32)*** 22.71 (5.46)*** 13.20 (5.04)*** 23.83 (6.57)***
UK -3.97 (1.97)** 5.15 (4.71) -27.17 (1.37)*** -16.37 (4.39)*** -3.20 (2.09) 2.70 (4.75)
USA (Ref) 0 0 0 0 0 0